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A powerful moral dimension characterizes research on the problem of child soldiers. Given the importance of the moral issues, how critical is methodology and scientific neutrality? Child soldiers may be the most depressing topic in the field of international conflict, and the elimination of child soldiering is a completely laudable goal. But the methodological principles promoting good scholarship are still crucial. A more precise understanding of why children join violent conflicts, why irregular armies recruit and abduct children, why children leave irregular armies, and what problems they face after leaving will help us craft policies to reduce child soldiering.
Much of the literature on child soldiers comes from advocacy groups. Not only would it be unrealistic to expect such advocates to jump into complex statistical analyses; it would also be counterproductive. Advocacy groups are valuable precisely because they awaken readers to the horrors of child soldiering. The research of advocacy groups, nevertheless, can be informed and guided by the theoretical models and rigorous statistical techniques of the scientific community.
This essay adopts a somewhat "extremist" methodological perspective. Scientific inference, in this view, depends not only on what one knows but also on recognizing what one does not know, that is, on recognizing the gap between the data you have and the data you want.
This does not mean that the real limitations of data availability should be ignored; rather, we should be explicit about the consequences of the inevitable compromises imposed by limitations of time and money.
Research on child soldiers falls into four, somewhat arbitrarily defined categories.
Perhaps the best-known type is work based on compiling reports on ex-combatants in multiple countries. A good example is Ilene Cohn and Guy Goodwin-Gill's monograph Child Soldiers:
The Role of Children in Armed Conflict (1994 Suppose, as one indicator of "grievances," we want to assess the effects of poverty on the willingness of children to join irregular forces. Poverty rates are likely to be quite a bit higher in areas contested by guerrillas and government forces, because conflict destroys assets and disrupts agricultural activities. If we take the national poverty rate as our indicator of poverty, its observed effects will inevitably appear weaker than its true effects. Similarly, we expect that children are more likely to become child soldiers if one or both parents are dead. But the percentage of children missing one or both parents is much higher in disputed areas (areas contested by rebels, paramilitaries, and/or government forces) than in the nation as a whole.
Whether irregular forces are abducting kids or they join more or less voluntarily, local context matters. Children join because their friends join (Brett 2003); guerrillas abduct because they have already penetrated a village; the presence of other parentless children affects individual parentless children. Contextual effects need to be assessed at the appropriate level.
Sometimes the appropriate level is the faction, as in Pugel's discussion of four factional groups in Liberia (this volume), and sometimes it is the village or group of closely related villages.
Researchers must, in addition, take particular care with post-hoc explanations or rationalizations provided by ex-combatants who have left irregular forces.
People in Context
In the early years of public opinion surveys, two perspectives, the Michigan school and Its surveys frequently limited themselves to communities and neighborhoods. Such surveys could not be generalized to the national level, but they were better at illuminating the processes leading people to change their opinions and behaviors. In the end, the Michigan model dominated, in part because its surveys were better able to predict broad electoral outcomes and in part because a model assuming an atomized citizenry fit 20 th century American society.
The places where children fight are worlds away from late industrial society. No television, no air conditioning, no bedroom suburbs; these are places where face-to-face contact is the primary mode of persuasion, where ideas move through dense social networks. 6 And it is exactly here that surveys of smaller ecological units, surveys that include respondents' neighborhood and workplace contracts, may be better able to reveal the deeper motivations of adults and children as they confront irregular forces.
Selection Bias
Surveys of children as ex-combatants typically (perhaps always) suffer from a simple form of selection bias, because they fail to interview non-combatants.
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Some children join irregular forces; most children do not. Guerrillas and paramilitaries offer selective incentives to children, only some accept. What is it about these children that makes them more likely to respond to incentives? Only by comparing combatants to non-combatants can we assess these causal factors.
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Another form of selection bias comes from focusing solely on children. Recruitment of children may be no different from recruitment of adults. Moreover, the way irregular forces treat civilians affects the recruitment of children.
If the relevant population is not merely children and not merely ex-combatants, a given population then consists of non-combatants, volunteers, and victims of abduction. 
The Centrality of Time
Cross-sectional surveys cannot provide a basis for inference unless we assume that the variables included in the model are stable over time. In most political science research this assumption is questionable, but the temporal variation is often random and simply produces noise. 11 In research on child soldiers, however, time variation is an inherent and systematic problem. 
Model Interactions
Why do children join irregular forces? 
Impute Missing Data
In large-N analyses of child soldiering, missing data are almost a given. Earlier generations of scholars were trained simply to delete cases 'listwise,' that is, to drop entire cases if a measurement on any variable was missing. Such deletion is no longer acceptable, because it is now understood that the biases introduced by deletion can seriously distort inference (King et al.
2001
). Because data are rarely missing purely randomly, deletion biases results.
Listwise deletion is not always the wrong strategy. When the cases dropped are only a small portion of the dataset, and when they are representative of the whole dataset, i.e., a truly random sample, then deletion can work. But "representative" means that the chance an observation is missing does not depend on any data values, whether observed or missing.
Researchers should first ask why data are missing. Suppose we are modeling weight (Y)
as a function of gender (X). 14 If some respondents refuse to give their weight, Y will have missing values.
1. There may be no particular reason why some respondents give their weights and others do not. Thus the probability that Y is missing may have no relationship to X or Y.
Such data are "Missing Completely at Random (MCAR)."
2. One gender may be less likely to report its weight. Thus the probability that Y is missing depends only on the value of X. Such data are "Missing at Random (MAR)." 3. Heavy (or light) people may be less likely to disclose their weight. In this case, the probability that Y is missing depends on the unobserved value of Y itself. Such data are not missing at random (NMAR). This is the problem of "Non-Ignorable Missing Data."
In the study of child soldiering, missing data are especially unlikely to be missing completely at random (MCAR). Conflicts attracting less international attention are likely to be those with more missing data. International advocacy groups with limited resources naturally concentrate on the biggest conflicts. Smaller conflicts, conflicts farther back in time, conflicts initiated closer to the data collection point, conflicts involving political rather than ethnic grievances; all these will attract less attention. 15 But in all these cases, if we are trying to explain child soldier recruitment rates, the missing data can be modeled as a function of various independent variables (such as political rather than ethnic grievances). Hence these are all examples of "Missing at Random" (MAR) data.
Recall our earlier discussion of units of analysis or observation. It is easy to see that the unit of analysis problem impacts data availability. Though imprecise, estimates for variables predicting grievances or material inducements may exist at the national level. If such indicators have to be specified for multiple, smaller, units of observation, the likelihood of variables with missing observations is quite high.
Awareness of the problem is a first step toward its amelioration. If NGOs working on child soldiers understand that deleting cases because of missing data hinders inference, they will pay more attention to gathering complete data at appropriate observational levels in the first instance. It is always more difficult to go back and fill in data gaps than to structure a datagathering design correctly in the first place. .
Judging Explanations
In the words of King, Keohane and Verba, a social science theory is a "reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct" (1994, 19 In this volume, three papers stand out as self-consciously theory-driven, i.e., these three papers present comprehensive causal arguments derived from prior research. Jens Christopher Andvig and Scott Gates "Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict" emphasizes the economics of child labor as well as the psychology of children. For example, research on child behavior finds that children underestimate low probability risks when associated with losses, even if the risk of loss is fairly high. Children underestimate risks more than adolescents. Of course the world of child soldiers is unlike a Western laboratory setting, but this result provides some support to the idea that it may be easier for guerrilla organizations to employ children than adults, given the inherently high risk-reward ratios of these conflicts.
Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín's "Organizing Minors" stresses organizational factors. Within a given country, why do some armed forces recruit children while others do not? Noting that rational choice arguments are inherently limited -no rational calculation of costs vs. benefits would lead anyone to volunteer for a guerrilla force -Gutiérrez Sanín points to the differences between rent-seeking bands (as in Sierra Leone) and armies with a consistent political ideology and minimal rent-seeking, such as the FARC in Colombia. The FARC was too big and too serious to rely on selective incentives, hence its leaders were forced to develop socialization mechanisms promoting gregariousness and a sense of the collective in its recruits. The organization learned this through trial and error, i.e., after several military disasters. Gutiérrez-Sanín's analysis suggests that political armies, those whose objectives transcend rent seeking, either begin with mechanisms for socializing young recruits, develop such mechanisms in response to military debacles, or eventually cease to recruit young soldiers altogether. James Pugel's "Disaggregating the Causal Factors Unique to Child Soldiering"
demonstrates that eliminating one form of selection bias -by comparing child combatants to adult combatants -helps refine arguments about recruitment, because it turns out that certain factors thought to be unique to children are also present for adults. When Pugel disaggregated the warring groups in Liberia by faction and age of soldier, it turns out that the reasons cited by children for their participation in armed groups -money, family protection, and abductionwere the same as those cited by adults.
Conclusion
This essay began by defending a "principled" methodological perspective, laying out the data requirements and analytical techniques necessary for rigorous scientific testing of theories predicting whether and under what conditions children will participate in irregular forces.
Questions of data requirements and statistical methodologies are interwoven, because the statistical techniques suggested here usually require more and better quality data. Given the limited budgets of child soldier researchers, it would be naive to think that this "principled" perspective will be adopted wholesale. Where should researchers compromise? If we accept the importance of the social contexts in which potential child combatants live, we ought to be able to enrich our analyses of these contexts. One possibility is to interview enough people at the level of the community or neighborhood so that the aggregate opinionpolitical and social -of the social unit can be measured. Another possibility is to develop "snowball" samples, samples in which respondents provide information identifying their immediate social contacts. These contacts are in turn interviewed, and the resulting network constitutes the real social group encouraging or discouraging children from abandoning their communities to join irregular forces. Because interviewers are likely to be on the ground in the community already, such techniques can deepen our understanding of the forces impinging upon children without dramatically increasing the cost of research.
